Standing Committee B

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Sexual Offences Bill [Lords]

Roger Gale: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome back. I trust that you return refreshed and ready to debate clause 81. There are a number of amendments relating to the clause. The Committee knows my style for dealing with these issues: a clause stand part debate can take place at the beginning or at the end, not both. It is up to Members to decide whether they wish to go free range on the first group of amendments or save further fire until the end. I shall be the arbiter on what has been chosen. [Interruption.] All mobile phones and pagers should be turned off.Clause 81 Persons becoming subject to notification requirements

Clause 81 - Persons becoming subject to notification requirements

Hilton Dawson: I beg to move amendment No. 127, in
clause 81, page 38, line 20, after 'A person', insert 'aged 18 or over'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 128, in 
clause 82, page 38, line 39, at end add 'unless on the relevant date he was under 18; in which case he shall for all purposes be treated as at no time having been subject to the notification requirements of Part 1 of the Sexual Offenders Act 1997'.

Hilton Dawson: It is a pleasure to be back. It is a feature of a Committee when, after a break for the various delights of the conference season, we return to find that the fine amendment that had been crafted has had its legs taken from under it by the huge range of other amendments that the Under-Secretary has tabled to schedule 3.
 I am left in the position of arguing that young people under 18 who are convicted of rape, assault by penetration or administering a substance with intent, or of offences against a person with a mental disorder and causing sexual activity without consent, and young people who have been convicted of other sexual offences and sentenced to 12 months detention should not go on to the sex offenders register. I am not comfortable with that, partly because I am not entirely sure that that is what I want to argue and also because I accept that some young people can constitute a danger to others. Sexual offending against children and young people by children and young people is a serious problem. There may well be a good reason for some young people to be included in the sex offenders register. 
 I tabled the amendment in the spirit of concern that exists about the wide-ranging nature of clause 14. I would be grateful if the Under-Secretary told me how many young people, who would not have been 
 previously required to be registered, will be affected by the requirement. 
 I personally think that subjecting a child to registration and the requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 is at least potentially stigmatising and could fatally undermine future efforts to rehabilitate that child. On the other hand, I can conceive of circumstances in which registration could be part of a community treatment programme designed to address extremely serious offending behaviour. Not for the first time during discussion of the Bill, I am moved to point out the inadequacies of the criminal law—even of this excellent piece of criminal law—in relation to the treatment needs of children who abuse other children. 
 If, given the amendments to schedule 3 there is still a case for the registration of some children as sex offenders, I would be grateful if my hon. Friend were to justify that, not only in terms of the important assistance that that can give to the supervision and management of risk, but with regard to the support and treatment of young people who clearly require help—whether or not that is in the community, or in health or care settings. The Government are beholden to justify why any child or young person should be subjected to registration. It is also important to be clear about the ways that their amendments to schedule 3 have improved that situation: they have restricted the numbers of children and young people who might be subject to that.

Annette Brooke: It is very nice to be back.
 I want to follow on from the previous presentation, which was so clear that most of my notes have been rendered unnecessary. That makes things a little difficult. I am glad that this has been a listening Government: they have listened to the points raised in the House of Lords and on the Floor of the Commons, and the amendments that are coming forth are very welcome. 
 However, I have a couple of queries. It is difficult to make a judgment about such serious crimes when we are sitting in a Committee Room. That emphasises one of my concerns, which I pick up on in a later amendment. I am troubled by the mechanistic approach with regard to matters such as the time that will be spent on the sexual offenders register. It is important to have a case-by-case approach. I am also uncomfortable with the link between treatment and registration. Because of the Government's amendments, that has become even more important. Are we saying that those convicted of the lesser offences will not automatically receive treatment? We have opened something up, and I want to open it up further by breaking the link between registration and treatment, and by making it clear that any young person, at whatever level of caution or conviction, is referred for treatment. I want to use what we have positively. I look forward to hearing the Minister's response. 
 Many of these young people are likely to have suffered abuse themselves: that is statistically proven. Treatment must be a part of what we are talking 
 about. Registration is about the risk to the community, and assessments of risk must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Those two things must be separated, and there must be different approaches.

Julie Morgan: I, too, am pleased with the amendments to schedule 3 that have been tabled. The hon. Lady said that this is a listening Government: those amendments show that they have been listening, and I welcome them.
 However, I still want to put on the record my concern about children being placed on the register in the same way as are adults. As the hon. Lady said, many of these children have been victims of abuse themselves. It is essential that young people go on the register only in the most extreme circumstances: to be on it could blight their life because of its implications for schooling and jobs. There are also other opportunities that they may not be able to take advantage of if they are on the register, because being on it will be stigmatising for them. I am pleased with the amendments, but I still have concerns about the remaining groups of children who could be on the register, and want to consider the implications for their lives. We must remember that they are children too, and may also have been victims.

Dominic Grieve: I was intending to reserve my main comments for the amendments to schedule 3, but as the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre has triggered general discussion, I would not want the matter to pass without placing on the record my welcome for the approach that the Government appear to be taking. Of course, I am mindful of the hon. Lady's comments—

Roger Gale: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman so early on, but I am slightly concerned that we might be moving on to schedule 3. I am fairly relaxed about how the Committee debates subjects, as long as it debates them only once. When I said—reasonably flexibly, I thought—that I was prepared to allow a stand part debate at either the beginning or the end of clause 81, I meant a debate on clause 81. If we get into a more wide-ranging debate, hon. Members will need to take that fact into account, because it will colour my judgment on debate on schedule 3.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to you, Mr. Gale. Clearly, amendment No. 127, tabled by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre, triggers an entire discussion of the position of those under 18; that is what he intended it to do. The detail of the matter will, of course, be followed up in what will be discussed under schedule 3. All that I wanted to say at this stage was that I accept that there is a difficult balancing exercise between the desire not to stigmatise but to provide help—we know that young people who commit offences are far more amenable to responding to treatment than those who are older—and providing public protection against activities that can be extremely predatory, often towards younger children. That is a difficult issue for the Committee's consideration. I will reserve my more
 detailed comments for the Under-Secretary's extremely interesting amendments.

Paul Goggins: I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre for moving the goalposts during the recess, although as he and other Committee members acknowledged, they have been moved in a positive way that meets with the Committee's agreement. We have discussed the matter before in Committee, and are all agreed that young people who sexually offend present special problems, and the way that they are treated needs to take that into account.
 My hon. Friend asks in what circumstances it would be right for a young person to be placed on the register. Only last April, a 15-year-old boy was convicted of raping a 25-year-old woman when he was 14. The judge, when sentencing him to seven years in custody and four on extended licence, stated that he regarded the offender as a ''dangerous young man''. Clearly, there are young people who pose that level of threat, and who need to be caught within the notification requirements. 
 In essence, taking into account amendments that we shall move later, and which I do not wish to discuss now, the assurance that my hon. Friend and others seek is that for a young person to be caught by the notification requirements, the offence must be so serious that it warrants a 12-month custodial sentence; or, even if there is another disposal—a community disposal or a caution—the offence must be very serious. It is also important to note that young people who become subject to the notification requirements have a notification period half that of an adult who commits a similar offence. 
 I hear the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Mrs. Brooke) call for a more individualised system. We shall discuss that later, but I wanted to say now that notification is not part of the sentence; it is an administrative process that aids the system of public protection. It is important to make that distinction. We in Committee must guard against taking steps that would make the notification requirements part of the sentence. 
 Both the hon. Lady and my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre mentioned treatment. Clearly, we all recognise that however heinous a crime a young person commits, a serious sexual offence will need appropriate treatment. Registration will mean that young offenders come under the multi-agency public protection arrangements. Under those arrangements all agencies, including social services, are involved in the management of young offenders. I hope that that offers hon. Members some assurance that we take seriously the public protection issue and the individual needs of such offenders.

Annette Brooke: Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether—in light of the laudable amendments to come—there will automatically be a multi-agency approach towards the young people who are not put on the sex offenders register?

Paul Goggins: I understand that they would not automatically come under the remit of the multi-agency public protection arrangements. Clearly, those arrangements would apply to anyone who was on the register, but not necessarily to those who were not. The risk assessment that is made on individuals depends on individual circumstances. I can confirm that where there is a requirement to register, such individuals would come under the remit of the MAPPA.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 241, in
clause 81, page 38, line 22, at end insert 
 'but not given an absolute discharge'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 243, in 
clause 82, page 38, line 34, at end insert 
 'but not given an absolute discharge'.

Humfrey Malins: Although this is a probing amendment, I hope that the Government will take on board the central theme that is common to it and amendment No. 243.
 I think that we all accept that a requirement to notify and be part of the sex offenders register is quite burdensome, involving a period of time and duties; so it should be. We also accept that there is a vast difference between terribly minor offences and serious offences. Hence my amendment, which would insert the words 
''but not given an absolute discharge''
 in clause 81. That would exempt for the purposes of notification a person who was given an absolute discharge. 
 From time to time, in courts throughout the country, there is somebody who is technically guilty of an offence, but such is the overwhelming mitigation that the court feels bound, in effect, to impose no penalty. The difference between a conditional discharge and an absolute discharge is this: if one is conditionally discharged for six months, for example, one is subject to a condition not to offend within that period; if one does offend, the first and second offences are dealt with at a subsequent hearing. In contrast, an absolute discharge may occur when a court feels that the offence is perhaps so trivial and the mitigation is so overpowering, that it is unnecessary to impose any punishment on the offender. Such an offender would leave court with a conviction, but without any form of penalty. It strikes me that under the Bill as currently drafted, a person who was given an absolute discharge would nevertheless be subject to the notification requirements. I wonder whether the Government think that that is right—perhaps some concession could be made. 
 Like some of my colleagues, I know very little about the register of sex offenders. Perhaps the Under-Secretary will, at a later stage in our deliberations, answer some specific questions. For example, I do not know where or in what form the register is kept, nor what the annual costs of keeping the register are. I do not know how many people are on it, how many staff work part-time on the register, or what the annual salary costs are. Nor do I know much about the follow-up procedure on registering in terms of the commitments of the person being registered or the duties of the persons keeping the register. It might be helpful to know a little more about that. 
 However, I am particularly concerned about those who receive an absolute discharge, hence the amendment, the purpose of which is to ask whether it is essential that such persons find themselves subject to the notification requirements.

Paul Goggins: I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising some interesting questions. He will forgive me if I do not respond to them immediately; the answers are interesting and I am sure that the Committee will be interested to hear them later.
 The hon. Gentleman argues powerfully, but I hope that he will be reassured when I tell him that the amendment is not necessary. The Bill will not require somebody with an absolute discharge to be on the register. Under current law, a conviction for an offence for which the offender receives an absolute or conditional discharge does not lead to notification. We have reflected on that and we believe that in certain circumstances, where a conditional discharge is given for a serious offence, the offender should comply with the notification requirements—but only for the duration of the conditional discharge. An absolute discharge will continue not to be considered a conviction for the purpose of triggering the notification requirements. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman and that he will withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: I am utterly reassured and I thank the Minister for his helpful response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 242, in
clause 81, page 38, line 26, leave out paragraph (d).

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 244, in 
clause 82, page 38, line 38, leave out paragraph (d).
 Amendment No. 248, in 
clause 83, page 40, line 27, leave out '2 years' and insert '1 year'.
 Amendment No. 377, in 
clause 95, page 48, line 32, leave out paragraph (d).
 Amendment No. 378, in 
clause 104, page 53, line 33, leave out paragraph (d).

Dominic Grieve: The amendment deals with cautions, which are another issue relating to adults, although it could also cover others. There is a growing ''caution culture'' in the way in which we deal with offences. In
 more and more cases, the police, perfectly properly, are taking the administrative decision not to prosecute a person in return for an admission of guilt; a caution is then given. The Bill would make cautions notifiable and registrable. The notification period provided under clause 83 would be two years, beginning with the date of the caution.
 The first thing that struck me when I looked at the provision was the contrast with the notification period in relation to a conditional discharge, which is the period of the conditional discharge. Conditional discharge periods can be as short as 12 months. We therefore face a potentially bizarre situation, in which a person is picked up for an offence and admits it, the police decide that the matter is so trivial that no legal process need be initiated, and the person accepts a caution, yet that person could be on the register longer than a person who was prosecuted and was given a conditional discharge by the court. That discharge would mean that nothing would happen provided that the individual did not commit a further offence within the 12-month or two-year period imposed. That seems illogical 
 The purpose of the amendment is to probe whether cautions should trigger registration and notification at all; and, if they do trigger registration and notification, to ask for what period that should apply. Should it be two years, as provided for under clause 83, or should it only be 12 months, which is the proposal that I put forward for the Committee's consideration? 
 We must be reasonable. On the face of it, most people regard a sex offence as a serious matter. If the police decide that the matter is so trivial that it can be resolved by a caution, it must follow that they consider that it is of little importance and that that person's activities do not pose a risk to the public, which raises a powerful argument that registration and notification might not be required. For example, certain acts and antisocial behaviour might be considered improper—let us suppose that a drunken person in a restaurant pinches the waitress's bottom. He might not have any previous convictions and be of good character, as a result of which there is no suggestion that he is a deviant. Such behaviour might come within the category of a caution. However, if such behaviour is considered so serious that it should be subject to a prosecution for indecent assault, what type of case will come within the category of being subject only to a caution? 
 The Committee really needs to consider such matters. We must face up to the fact that although, as the Minister said, such a procedure may be only administrative, it is onerous and potentially humiliating. A person who is subject to registration and notification might have to attend a police station at a time that is inconvenient to him because he is busy. He has to face the humiliating process of saying over the counter at the police station, probably with many other people queuing behind him, that he has come to register as a sex offender because he has changed his address and so on. Such matters may be important for the sake of public protection, but, when 
 passing the legislation, I do not believe that it is Parliament's intention that people should be subjected to an humiliating punishment because we think, ''Serves you right.'' 
 The registration procedure should exist for public protection, not to entertain members of the public at the police station. Anyone who, having been stopped for a peculiar arbitrary reason by the police, has visited a police station under the HORT1 procedure and been required to produce his driving licence knows that it is a time-consuming and irritating exercise. We must bear in mind that we should not place burdens on people without good cause. 
 I consider that sex offences are serious matters, including those of pinching a waitress's bottom. I put two questions to the Committee: if the offence is so trivial that the police decide that a caution is good enough punishment, why are we requiring registration? Secondly, if we decide that there should be registration, is there not something slightly odd about providing that registration under a caution will be for a longer period than a registration under a conditional discharge when the court has decided that some supervision should follow up on the conviction even though no punishment was imposed? The Committee must consider the illogicality in that.

Annette Brooke: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his helpful, probing amendment, which has enabled us to pick up on a discussion that we left in the air when debating clause 68. When we discussed that clause, we considered the point that a naturist, for example, might, in trying to get out of a difficult situation, accept a caution if allegations were being made. It was felt that such matters would become completely out of proportion because of the register. I referred to that problem at the time and the Minister responded to it. However, I still thought that such a situation was not quite right. I was not brave enough to suggest a deletion of cautions because I could envisage some examples when it would be appropriate for such matters to be on the sexual offences register. I sound wishy-washy, but it seems that such matters need to be considered more on a case-by-case basis.
 There needs to be some sensible discretion at least, otherwise the examples that have been quoted could lead to injustice. The procedure is very mechanistic: there is a caution, then straight on to the register without the individual case being considered. People would be horrified to learn of the many cases in which somebody could be pushed into an humiliating and damaging situation even if they were innocent and had simply accepted a caution rather than challenging it.

Paul Goggins: There has been an interesting discussion on the amendments. It is important to say at the outset that the fact that someone has been given a caution does not mean that the offence for which they were given that caution is not a serious offence. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked me in what circumstances that might be the case. For example, sexual abuses might have taken place within the family and the victim, for understandable reasons, is unwilling to testify against the offender; taking such
 a case to court where the victim must give evidence might be felt to be far too traumatic. In such circumstances it may be felt that, on balance, although the offence was serious a caution is the fairest and more just outcome.
 Cautions are, of course, given by the police for less serious sexual offences, but they lead to registration only where offences involve children. In the case raised by that the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole, and in the case raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield of pinching a waitress's bottom, I hope that they understand that if the charge is a less serious one and does not involve children it will not lead to automatic registration. 
 At the beginning, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield raised a point about the caution culture. We will want to consider that in terms of how we follow through this legislation. The form that the police issue when they give a caution makes it clear that the caution brings with it an automatic requirement to register. We shall examine such matters further when we consider the Bill's implementation, and decide whether we should issue explicit guidance to the police on the need to make the consequences of accepting a caution in terms of registration absolutely clear, verbally and in writing. 
 Amendment No. 248 would reduce the notification period following a caution from two years to one year. As I hope that I have explained, cautions may generally be viewed, but should not always be viewed, as something at the lower end of the scale. There has been some debate about that. The review of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 concluded that the notification period should be reduced to 12 months. We received strong representations from other organisations, including the police, that 12 months was far too short. On balance, we believe that two years is right. 
 Finally, amendments Nos. 377 and 378 would remove the possibility of a notification order or a sexual offences prevention order being made against an offender who had received a caution for sexual offences overseas. We see no reason for differentiating between someone cautioned for an offence overseas and someone cautioned for an offence in this country; they are of equal significance and require the same response.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary. He has persuaded me that cautions should be included in the category for the reasons that he has given. However, I still have an anxiety about the period. There is an oddity in the juxtaposition of that and what happens in the case of conditional discharge.
 The Under-Secretary suggested that cautions are sometimes imposed for serious offences. I was appalled to hear the example that he gave. I suppose that some people may accept cautions in the circumstances that he suggested, but, if someone who had been properly advised was told that a serious allegation was being made against him on no evidence, I would be surprised if he accepted the caution. In the case of sex abuse within the family, I can see that there might be circumstances in which it could be decided that it would be so traumatic to the child concerned 
 that prosecution would be inadvisable. However, that struck me as a surprising example. I would wish people to be prosecuted in those circumstances.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is on to a good point: I, too, was surprised that the Under-Secretary gave that example. If—in a family situation, for instance—a victim was unwilling to substantiate an allegation, 99 times out of 100 the Crown would offer no evidence, and any potential defendant who was advised on the matter would sit and wait until the decision was taken, rather than accept a caution.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is right. I do not want to stray too far from the point, but this is an interesting subject, and we might have to look at a later stage at the way that cautions are being used in England and Wales.

Paul Goggins: To clarify, I was not suggesting that in all circumstances that would be the appropriate outcome. I was simply pointing out that that might be a circumstance in which a caution would be a justifiable way of dealing with a perpetrator of such serious offences, bearing in mind the vulnerability of the witness and the trauma of having to go through court proceedings.

Dominic Grieve: I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman is saying. If that is the argument, it could also be argued that a registration period of two years is insufficient. To impose cautions where there is no evidence against someone but he is prepared to accept that he committed a serious offence is a strange thing to do, but if that is becoming common practice in England and Wales there might be a strong argument that he should be registered for much longer. There is a degree of tokenism about the two-year period if someone who poses a serious public threat will be off the register after two years. I thought that cautioning would be imposed in cases that the police considered not to require prosecution.

Vera Baird: I wonder whether it is likely that a caution will be used if there is no evidence. Is it not more likely to be used where there is evidence, such as semen deposits? If there is such evidence but the prosecution are not confident that they will be carried over the 51 per cent. barrier without the child—and if they are unsure how the child will hold up—a caution might be a reasonable outcome.
 However, I share the hon. Gentleman's concern that a nudist who accepts a caution because it is easier to take it than to be prosecuted, with all the disapproval and publicity that that might produce, will get exactly the same registration on the sex offences register as a person who appears to have committed very serious offences but is not prosecuted because the witness is not up to supporting their prosecution. That is an odd approach, given that the rest of the schedule is linked to sentences, and therefore to gravity.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. and learned Lady is right that that must be the example of circumstances where a caution would be resorted to by the police—when they are anxious at least to register something in relation to a defendant, but they are not confident that a case would hold up in court. That is the only set of
 circumstances in which I can foresee the police properly allowing a caution for what might be a serious offence. The hon. and learned Lady is also right that this is an odd situation, because we will end up with trivial matters being visited with a period of registration in excess of that for conditional discharges.
 I accept that this is a difficult issue but I should be grateful if the Under-Secretary would think it through a little further. Is there really a much greater benefit in registering someone for two years than for 12 months? They would be off the register fairly quickly anyway.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman makes a request that has been backed up by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). I think of little other than the implications of the Sexual Offences Bill, so I am more than happy to reflect on the matter, and to come back to the hon. Gentleman with an answer in due course.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 - Sexual offences for purposes of Part 2

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 259, in
schedule 3, page 78, line 36, at end insert 
 'and— 
 (a) the conviction, finding or caution was before the commencement of this Part, or 
 (b) the offender— 
 (i) was 18 or over, or 
 (ii) is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendments Nos. 260 to 262. 
 Amendment No. 245, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 13, leave out subparagraph (i).
 Amendment No. 246, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 28, leave out '12' and insert '6'.
 Government amendment No. 263. 
 Amendment No. 247, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 39, leave out '12' and insert '6'.
 Government amendments Nos. 264 to 271, 273, 275 to 277, 280 to 301, 303 and 305 to 307.

Paul Goggins: That is a considerable amount to get through. I shall try to do so as thoroughly and speedily as possible.
 The schedule lists the offences that trigger the notification requirements. Some of the offences cover a range of offending behaviour, so disposal thresholds are applied that must be met before the notification 
 requirements are triggered. That ensures that the requirements are restricted to more serious offenders. 
 The Government amendments in the group will extend the application of the threshold relating to young offenders to a wider range of offences. The amendments will ensure that only the most serious young offenders become subject to the notification requirements. We are also making changes to the schedule that will ensure consistency in the use of the community punishment threshold. There are other amendments, including minor drafting amendments and some that would change the list of offences in Northern Ireland. Amendments Nos. 245, 246 and 247 are intended to change the thresholds to notification. I shall speak to those in turn. 
 We believe that young offenders should continue to be subject to the registration requirements where they have committed the most serious sexual offences. We have already discussed that. However, we recognise that registration is not appropriate in less serious cases. The schedule already contains disposal thresholds for certain offences, which means that young offenders will go on the sex offenders register only when they receive a sentence of at least 12 months imprisonment. That excludes completely offenders under 12 and means that final warnings, reprimands, community sentences and periods of detention of less than 12 months do not trigger registration. 
 Amendments in the group will extend the threshold to cover a wider range of offences, which are as follows: those relating to indecent photographs of children; familial child sex offences; care worker offences; paying for the sexual services of a child where the victim or other party is under 16; committing an offence, or trespassing with intent to commit a sexual offence; sex with an adult relative; intercourse with an animal; and sexual penetration of a corpse. 
 A reprimand, final warning, conditional discharge, community sentence or term of imprisonment of less than one year will not lead to registration for the offences. Registration will remain automatic, however, where a young offender is convicted, cautioned, or subject to a finding for the most serious sexual offences: the rape of a child under 13, or any rape, assault by penetration and assault of a child under 13 by penetration, administering a substance with intent, offences against persons with a mental disorder, causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent and causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity. 
 Amendment No. 246 would reduce from 12 to six months the imprisonment threshold for child sex offences committed by children or young persons. There is clearly a balance to be drawn. The 12-month imprisonment threshold for young offenders is set at the right level. Committee members have already said that there is a stigma attached to registration. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, there is evidence that young sexual offenders have a much greater chance of changing their behaviour and leading law-abiding lives. 
 The second purpose of the Government amendments in the group is to ensure consistency in the use of the community punishment threshold. There are currently two thresholds. Under the first an adult offender must receive a 12-month community sentence before registration is triggered for the offences of abuse of trust and committing an offence, or trespassing with intent to commit a sexual offence. 
 Under the second threshold, an adult offender will only qualify for registration when he receives a community sentence of at least 18 months for the offences of sexual assault, exposure, or care worker offences. Having different community punishment thresholds for different offences makes schedule 3 unnecessarily complex, so the amendments will standardise the community punishment to a community sentence of at least 12 months. I also believe that the 12-month community sentence threshold should apply to the offence of voyeurism, and that will be done through amendments Nos. 275 and 276. 
 Amendment No. 247 would change the current threshold for registration of the abuse of trust offences in clauses 18 to 21. Clearly, there is a need for consistency. Only the most serious offenders should become subject to the notification requirements. 
 Finally, amendment No. 245 would mean that an adult offender who committed a sexual assault against a child would only become subject to the notification requirement if he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, detained in a hospital or had received a community sentence of at least 18 months—I intend to change that threshold to 12 months. I oppose the amendment; all adults who commit a sexual offence against a child should be placed on the register. As always—this strikes to the heart of the work of the Committee—the protection of children is fundamental.

Roger Gale: Hon. Members will appreciate that there are a series of complex and interlinked amendments in this group and the following two. Once again, I am perfectly happy to allow wide-ranging debate, but only on the understanding that there will be no schedule 3 stand part debate afterwards. I call Mr. Malins.

Humfrey Malins: Thank you, Mr. Gale. I shall speak only to amendments Nos. 246 and 247 to schedule 3. Amendment No. 246, in relation to young persons' offences under clause 14, would alter the trigger from 12 months imprisonment to six months imprisonment. These are essentially probing amendments, but I must tell the Minister why I tabled them.
 It is important to say immediately that no court in this country sends anyone to prison unless it absolutely has to. Indeed, in passing a sentence, any judge must use a form of words that begins: ''The offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified.'' Very properly, judges are constantly being urged not to send someone to prison. 
 Let us move from that proposition to the next: generally, the younger the person before the court, the 
 shorter the sentence passed, whatever the gravity of the offence. When dealing with a young person who commits an offence so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified, judges are correctly urged to pass the minimum possible sentence. Thus, an offence that would result in a sentence of 18 months if an adult committed it might, in the case of someone between 15 and 18—that is who we are dealing with in clause 14—attract half that sentence, namely nine months. The offences might be equally serious, but the sentence imposed would be very different because of the age of the person appearing before court. That is perfectly proper, but we must not take our eye off the point that the offences in question may be equally serious. 
 Therefore, taking an offence under clause 14 for which a young person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ''at least 12 months''—and my amendments would substitute six months—we would have a situation where even a sentence of six months would not be imposed unless the offence were terribly serious, because the courts would try hard, in the case of a young person, to bring the sentence down. The amendment makes the point that the requirements under the Bill should perhaps apply, in the case of a younger person, where a sentence of six months or more is passed, because no such sentence would be passed unless the matter were very grave indeed. I hope that the Under-Secretary understands the thrust of my argument and that he will look favourably, or at least constructively, on the point that I have made. A younger person, even when an offence is terribly serious, might, because of age, get a much lower sentence.

Paul Goggins: I shall try to give a short and precise response to the hon. Gentleman's point. Twelve months imprisonment for a young offender is pitched at the middle of the available detention period; a detention and training order can go up to 24 months detention. These things are a question of balance and we are attempting to draw that balance at a point that reflects the most serious offences. That is why we feel strongly that the balance should be put at 12 months rather than the six months that he suggests.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman rightly says that he is aiming at the most serious offences, but does he accept that two identical, terribly serious offences, one committed by someone of 23 or 24 and one committed by someone of 15 or 16, might result in different sentences: for example, six months for the younger person and 18 months for the older person?

Paul Goggins: They might indeed result in different sentences; I would expect that in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has suggested. However, at all stages in the criminal justice system a young person's individual circumstances and their offence are taken into account. A 12-month sentence for a young person, whatever their age, would be a reflection of the seriousness of the offence. To send a child to prison for 12 months or more would reflect a very serious offence. I put it to the hon. Gentleman again: there is a balance. Perhaps there is no absolutely right or wrong answer, but we must achieve a balance. I think that six months would be too low and that 12 months is about right.

Dominic Grieve: I am conscious that, leaving aside the matters raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), it appears likely that there will be a marked lack of debate on the Government's schedule 3 proposals. Having noted that, I did not want to let the matter pass without saying something. I thank the Under-Secretary for reviewing the subject. The provisions are all considerable improvements on the way the Bill was when it came into being. The various changes contemplated in relation to young offenders, the community punishment threshold and the removal of the notification requirements for offenders convicted for consensual homosexual activity are all to be welcomed. As there appears to be unanimity that those are improvements to the Bill, I do not intend to take up the Committee's time any further. Perhaps I pessimistically thought that more would be said about those issues. I am therefore delighted to tell the Under-Secretary that we welcome all the proposals.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 263, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 30, leave out 
 ', where the offender is under 18, he' 
 and insert 'the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) '.
 No. 264, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 39, at end insert— 
 '23A An offence under section 27 or 28 of this Act (familial child sex offences) if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'
 No. 265, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 40, leave out '27, 28 or'.
 No. 266, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 40, leave out 'familial child sex offences,'.
 No. 104, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 41, leave out 'or learning disability'.
 No. 105, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 42, leave out 'or learning disability'.
 No. 106, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 45, leave out 'or learning disability'.
 No. 267, in 
schedule 3, page 79, line 45, after 'if' insert '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case,'.
 No. 268, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 3, leave out from 'least' to end of line 7 and insert '12 months.'.
 No. 269, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 9, at end insert 
 ', and the offender—
(a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 270, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 13, at end insert— 
 '(a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case—'.
 No. 271, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 20, at end insert 
 '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case,'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 272, in
schedule 3, page 80, line 25, after 'sentenced' insert 
 'in respect of the offence'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendment No. 274. 
 Government amendment No. 302. 
 Government amendment No. 304.

Paul Goggins: This could be the shortest speech that I make today. This group of amendments improves the consistency of the wording in schedule 3 by adding the words ''in respect of the offence'' when referring to the thresholds for exposure and voyeurism. I am sure that this will command the support of the Committee.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 273, in 
schedule 3, page 80, leave out lines 34 to 38 and insert '12 months.'.
 No. 274, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 40, after 'sentenced' insert 
 'in respect of the offence'.
 No. 275, in 
schedule 3, page 80, line 46, leave out 'or'.
 No. 276, in 
schedule 3, page 81, line 1, at end insert 
 ', or 
 (c) made the subject of a community sentence of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 277, in 
schedule 3, page 81, line 3, after 'if' insert '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case,'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 278, in
schedule 3, page 81, leave out lines 17 to 19 and insert 
 'every person involved in the offence was 16'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendment No. 279. 
 Government amendments Nos. 308 to 310. 
 Government amendments Nos. 315 to 319. 
 Government amendment No. 321.

Paul Goggins: Amendments Nos. 278 and 279 provide that persons who commit the common law offence of sodomy or an offence under section 13(5) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 will be subject to automatic registration unless the homosexual acts were consensual and all parties were over the age of 16.
 Amendments Nos. 308, 309 and 310 are technical amendments that draw an explicit distinction between parental directions imposed by criminal courts and those imposed by civil courts in Scotland in terms of the procedures and circumstances where such directions can be varied, renewed and discharged in Scotland. A parental direction is one imposed in relation to certain young offenders who are subject to the notification requirements, and it has the effect of making the person with parental responsibilities to the young offender subject to the obligations of the Act. 
 Amendments Nos. 308 to 310 clarify that it will the chief constable who can apply for variations of the direction when original direction was made by the civil court. The amendments also ensure that where the direction was imposed by a criminal court it is the public prosecutor in Scotland who can make an application to vary, renew and discharge parental directions, and that any such application must be in accordance with rules of court made by the High Court of Justiciary by Act of adjournal. 
 Clauses 106 and 107 make provision for the variation, renewal and discharge of sexual offences prevention orders and interim sexual offences prevention orders. Existing sex offender orders made under the 1998 regime will be subject to those provisions. Amendments Nos. 315, 316, 318 and 319 to subsections (8) in both clauses align the existing sex offender and interim sex offender regime operating in Scotland with the procedural provisions being put in place for the sexual offences prevention orders. The reason why those clauses do not include the references to Scottish sex offender orders at present is that at introduction the Bill did not seek to replace these orders. The Scottish position is now set out in the Bill and the amendments are consequential in light of that. 
 Amendment No. 317 ensures that chief constables in Scotland can apply for interim sexual offences prevention orders for orders provided in clause 103. The order set out in clause 103 is specific to Scotland, can be granted against an extended category of offender in Scotland and is pursuant to recommendations 40 and 41 of the expert panel on sex offending, whereby a person who is convicted of an offence with a significant sexual aspect can be caught by the notification order provisions of the Bill. 
 Amendment No. 317 makes explicit in the clause dealing with interim SOPOs that an application for such interim orders can also be made in conjunction with or pursuant to an application for an order under the Cosgrove processes in clause 103. 
 On amendment No. 321, clause 111 provides that the courts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
 will not be able to make an order for conditional discharge in imposing sentence for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. Probation orders are the equivalent Scottish sentence and amendment No. 321 will prevent the Scottish courts from making probation orders for breach of a SOPO or an interim SOPO. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 279, in 
schedule 3, page 82, leave out lines 12 to 18 and insert 
 'every person involved (whether in the offence or in the homosexual act) was 16 or over and was a willing participant'.
 No. 280, in 
schedule 3, page 82, line 31, leave out paragraph 59.
 No. 281, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 11, leave out '18' and insert '12'.
 No. 282, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 13, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 283, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 19, leave out '17' and insert 
 '18, and the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months'.
 No. 284, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 32, leave out '18' and insert '12'.
 No. 285, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 34, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 286, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 36, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 287, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 38, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 288, in 
schedule 3, page 83, line 41, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 289, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 2, leave out from 'if' to end of line 3 and insert '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case— 
 (i) the victim or (as the case may be) other party was under 18, or 
 (ii) the offender, in respect of the offence or finding, is or has been— 
 (a) sentenced to a term of imprisonment, or 
 (b) detained in a hospital.'.
 No. 290, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 4, leave out from 'if' to end of line 5 and insert '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case— 
 (i) the victim or (as the case may be) other party was under 18, or 
 (ii) the offender, in respect of the offence or finding, is or has been— 
 (a) sentenced to a term of imprisonment, or 
 (b) detained in a hospital.'.
 No. 291, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 8, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 292, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 9, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 293, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 11, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 294, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 16, at end insert 
 ', and the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 295, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 19, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 296, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 23, at end insert 
 'if— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case, the offender, in respect of the offence or finding, is or has been— 
 (i) sentenced to a term of imprisonment, 
 (ii) detained in a hospital, or 
 (iii) made the subject of a community sentence of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 297, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 26, at end insert 
 'if the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 298, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 28, leave out 'was 20 or over' and insert 
 ', in respect of the offence or finding, is or has been— 
 (a) sentenced to a term of imprisonment, 
 (b) detained in a hospital, or 
 (c) made the subject of a community sentence of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 299, in 
schedule 3, page 84, line 34, at end insert 
 'and the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 300, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 2, leave out '18' and insert '12'.
 No. 301, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 11, at end insert 
 'and the offender— 
 (a) was 18 or over, or 
 (b) is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to a term of imprisonment of at least 12 months'.
 No. 302, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 13, after 'sentenced' insert 
 'in respect of the offence'.
 No. 303, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 22, leave out '18' and insert '12'.
 No. 304, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 24, after 'sentenced' insert 
 'in respect of the offence'.
 No. 305, in 
'schedule 3, page 85, line 30, leave out 'or'.
 No. 306, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 31, at end insert 
 ', or 
 (c) made the subject of a community sentence of at least 12 months.'.
 No. 307, in 
schedule 3, page 85, line 33, after 'if' insert '— 
 (a) where the offender was under 18, he is or has been sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; 
 (b) in any other case,'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clause 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 83 - The notification period

Annette Brooke: I beg to move amendment No. 252, in
clause 83, page 40, line 33, leave out from 'date' to end of line 35 and insert 
 'the notification period shall be defined on a case by case basis by he court.'.
 I have alluded to the amendment, so I shall be brief. It would replace the mechanical formula. I wish to emphasise the obvious in that we are talking about young people with varying characteristics and backgrounds. Given that they are at a relatively early stage in their lives, they have no hardened background, but something that we can attempt to analyse and treat. Why, therefore, in a formative stage of a young person's development, should there be an automatic period to be on the sexual offenders register? 
 We have established that such a period will be stigmatising, so harm could be caused. I accept completely that the sexual offenders register exists to protect the public. I also accept the Under-Secretary's arguments, but I return to the overriding factor that we shall make much more progress in society if we tackle some of the acts at an early and effective stage. That process would undermine the Government's excellent programmes under which they say that earlier intervention is the answer. A mechanistic approach will underline the fact that we will not consider the individual characteristics of the young people involved. Will the hon. Gentleman consider such matters?

Paul Goggins: I do not wish to restate the arguments with which the Committee is becoming familiar but, as has been said many times in Committee, I wish to emphasise to the hon. Lady that the age and circumstances of the particular child offender are always taken into consideration at every stage of the criminal justice process from investigation, to consideration of whether to prosecute through the court to the final disposal. The individual's circumstances are always taken into account.
 There are, of course, within the scheme already different periods for which a young offender would be on the register. As has already been said, for those aged under 18 years, the period is half the time that it would be for an adult who was convicted of a similar offence. Offenders who are subject to a detention and training order, for which the maximum term is 24 months, would be on the register for five years, but other young offenders who are convicted of serious offences that have not been dealt with by a custodial sentence, but by a reprimand, final warning or other community sentence, would be subject to notification requirements for one year or two and a half years, whichever was appropriate. There are circumstances in which a young offender guilty of the most serious offences may be subject to section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which would result in a 
 life period. I can tell the hon. Lady that only three young offenders have received a life sentence for a sexual offence since 1996, so we are talking about a small number of young people. I certainly have no qualms about emphasising again that young people who commit those grave offences need to be dealt with in the appropriate way. 
 The hon. Lady again mentions the idea of registration requirements reflecting the individual circumstances of the offender. I emphasise that we must guard against the notification requirements becoming part of the sentence. They are not part of the sentence; they are an administrative consequence of it that affords the appropriate public protection. That is an important point to emphasise.

Annette Brooke: I feel that there is no meeting of minds on the subject. My concerns remain, but the Under-Secretary has put some useful points on record, and I thank him for that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84 - Notification requirements: initial notification

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 218, in
clause 84, page 41, line 18, leave out '3 days' and insert '24 hours'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 373, in
clause 85, page 42, line 21, leave out '3 days' and insert '24 hours'.

Dominic Grieve: I hope that it will not be considered churlish for me to speak to the amendments, and I emphasise that they are probing amendments. In many respects, I have every reason to be delighted with what the Government have done under the clause because, as the Under-Secretary will be aware, I—and others—have been pressing for a reduction in the notification period of three days, and that is exactly what the Government have given us. Nevertheless, before we rubber-stamp the provisions, I thought it might be worth carefully considering whether we have got the period right. I suggest we do that by asking: if we are thinking of giving so short a period as three days, should we not make it even shorter, and give a period of 24 hours?
 The problem that exercised me long before the Bill came before Parliament was that there is no doubt that people can do an awful lot in short periods. We live in a country where travel is easy. A person can go anywhere they like in the United Kingdom in three days, and will have time to do quite a lot once they are there. It is not just a question of the time taken for travel; it is the time taken to move around. We know that in many cases, especially those of predatory paedophiles, life on the move is an absolute hallmark of the person's existence. One problem experienced in the past is that of keeping track of a person. I simply raise the question with the Minister. Obviously, one has to have a period in which registration can take place, and it will be three days too long. Should we require registration within, say, 24 hours?

Paul Beresford: I should like to support my hon. Friend on this point. He may not be aware that the Metropolitan police Thames branch are keeping an eye on a group of paedophiles who use canal boats. At the moment, they move back every 13 and a half days so that they cover the registration. They could very easily do so in three days. If we bring the time down to 24 hours, it would be exceptionally difficult for them.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That is precisely the point that I had in mind. One does not wish to impose conditions that are impossible to meet, so that people are criminalised unnecessarily for breaches. Nevertheless, 24 hours is a full day, and most police stations—well, some of them; not all of them, unfortunately—are open seven days a week, 24 hours a day. It should be possible for someone to find a police station at which to register. If we are really concerned about keeping a close check on the whereabouts of individuals, clearly the shorter the reporting time allowed, the more information will be available.
 As my hon. Friend rightly says, we must face up to the fact that the peripatetic lifestyle suits many paedophiles for a variety of reasons, some of which are utterly nefarious. I should like to stimulate some debate but I should also be interested to hear from the Under-Secretary why the Government have decided to come down to a period of three days, and whether they have considered a shorter period. If they feel that there are serious problems with the shorter period, perhaps that could be explained. Having decided to shorten the period, it is pointless to leave a further loophole that might be exploited.

Paul Goggins: I acknowledge the generosity of the hon. Gentleman's remarks and the spirit in which he moves the amendment. We must take account of balance and practicality. My strong view is that to reduce the period to 24 hours would be a step too far. I hope that I can reassure the Committee with some remarks about how I came to that conclusion.
 The most serious offenders are already required to report to their supervising probation officer within 24 hours of their release from prison. In some cases they may also be required to live at an approved hostel. A failure to comply with either of those conditions could result in an offender's immediate return to prison. The most serious offenders are already known to the authorities within 24 hours. If they fail to comply with those requirements, immediate action can be taken. 
 Committee members will have spotted that under clause 94 we intend to provide a power to make regulations governing the disclosure of information about registered sex offenders who are transferred between, or released from, institutions. Those regulations will ensure that the police are informed when a relevant offender is to be released from prison, hospital, or military detention. There are more powers to ensure the swift delivery of information on the most serious offenders. 
 Although I have made some reassuring comments, I am concerned that if we set a 24-hour period, there is a real risk that people may fail to meet the requirement, 
 despite the best of intentions. For example, an offender may be in full-time employment and may have considerable difficulties in arranging to give notification within 24 hours. 
 I heard what the hon. Gentleman said about police stations. Nevertheless, not every police station, whether it is open or not open, is designated for the purpose of the notification process. A person has to go to a designated police station, which may perhaps, in more remote—rural—areas, be a considerable way off. There are some practical difficulties. 
 There is also the question of what three days means, although the hon. Gentleman did not raise it—I did. When does a three-day period begin and end? I should like to reassure him. If a conviction were made, for example, at 4 o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon, the three-day period would begin on the midnight prior to it. In that example an offender would have to provide the information by midnight on Thursday. The period would never extend beyond three days. Indeed, it may sometimes be a little less than three days.

Humfrey Malins: It occurs to me that there may be a gap between conviction and sentence. I am not sure which is relevant.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman is as helpful as ever. If the sentence were passed at 4 o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon, the information would have to be provided within that period. I offer further reassurance that the period could not stray beyond three days—if anything it would be slightly less. I hope that the Committee feels able to support the Government.

Roger Gale: Does the Minister wish to speak again? I am trying to be as flexible as possible.

Paul Goggins: You are being very helpful, Mr. Gale, as are other hon. Members. It would be helpful for the Committee to know that it is sentence where there is threshold; otherwise it applies on conviction.

Dominic Grieve: I hope that I understand that last comment correctly. Doubtless, if I have not, the Under-Secretary will be passed another note and the matter will be clarified after the sitting.
 I appreciate the Minister's point about the potential practical difficulties. We do not want to get into a situation where innocent breaches constantly occur because people have a genuine difficulty. 
 I hope that the Under-Secretary will closely review this provision over the coming months when it starts to operate to see how it is working; if it is felt that there are still loopholes, we may have to come back to it.

Humfrey Malins: I may be wrong about this, but it occurs to me that it is entirely possible for somebody to be convicted on 12 March and then to come back to court a month later and be given an absolute discharge. Does my hon. Friend agree that that person is not required to register after the conviction, but only after the sentence? I want that to be clear.

Dominic Grieve: That was my understanding of how this operated. I should not see the private notes that are
 passed to Ministers, but I notice that the words ''clause 132'' seem to feature, so we might have an opportunity to consider this question when we get to that part of the Bill.

Paul Goggins: I confirm that there will be a further opportunity to consider this question under a later clause.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for that. I shall leave the matter until then, so that he has an opportunity to be better briefed, and I to better comprehend this part of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 249, in
clause 84, page 42, line 2, after 'date', insert 'or earlier.'
 The clause requires that the name is provided for the relevant date, and that where one or more names are used on that date, each of the names is provided. The amendment is intended merely to probe. Those of us who appear in court a great deal find that frequently a dozen names that have been used over a period of 10 or 15 years appear on the antecedents and history of the defendant. I want to make sure that all such names may be required to be disclosed, because it is common in court to find somebody using the name Joe Bloggs on the date of the offence, with eight previous aliases having been used over many years. Such knowledge might be helpful.

Paul Goggins: I do not know how many names one person can gather in a lifetime, but I am sure that some people can gather lots of them. If we were to agree to the amendment, every name that had ever been used by an offender would have to be disclosed. That is unnecessary. It is necessary that the real name, any name that may have been used at the time of the offence and any name that may be in use at present be disclosed, but it is unnecessary to delve back into distant history, before the offence was committed. for a name that has no relevance at present or at the time of the offence. If we know the names at the time of the offence and at present, that covers enough situations to give us the certainty and security that we seek.

Humfrey Malins: I merely wanted to highlight a possible difficulty. The Under-Secretary has taken my point on board and, as always, he has dealt with it helpfully. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 84 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86 - Notification requirements: periodic notification

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 374, in
clause 86, page 43, line 10, leave out 'to have' and insert 'has'.
 When I read the clause, I had difficulty in understanding what it meant. I concluded—not improperly, I hope—that it would read better if the words ''to have'' were removed and ''has'' was inserted. If the Under-Secretary thinks that it does 
 read better like that, he should accept the amendment: if he does not think so, I want him to explain why not.

Paul Goggins: This is the point during our considerations when we are all invited to put our faith in the parliamentary draftsmen. I understand the spirit in which the hon. Gentleman tabled his amendment, but rather than clarify the provisions of clause 86, it could result in the clause being understood to mean that all the events listed in subsection (1) have to have occurred before an offender is required to renotify his details, and not that any of the events is to have occurred. It is the last of the events that will trigger the renotification requirements. The hon. Gentleman's good intentions would unfortunately result in an outcome that neither he nor any other Committee member would desire. Having made some rigorous inquiries about the amendment prior to today's discussion, I am assured that we need to keep the wording as it is.

Dominic Grieve: May I read out subsection (1)? I have an alternative approach, but I am sure that I will be told that I am wrong. The subsection states:
''A relevant offender must notify to the police the information set out in section 84(5) within the period of one year after the last of the following events to have occurred'',
 and then surely the Minister must have meant the Bill to say ''namely''. With great respect to the parliamentary draftsmen, I find ending the sentence with the words ''to have occurred'' followed by that list to be astonishingly ungrammatical. It is ungrammatical to the extent that I had some difficulty in understanding what it meant. I take the Minister's point that the use of the word ''has'' could create a separate problem. However, inserting the word ''namely'' would clarify the situation.

Paul Goggins: I support the hon. Gentleman's pursuit of good grammar, and I promise that we will consider his remarks.
 If we accepted the hon. Gentleman's amendment the subsection could be taken to mean that all the events must have occurred. Not all of the events need to have occurred, and we want a situation where it is the last of them that has occurred that triggers notification. I hope that we are right—I feel that we are—and that the hon. Gentleman accepts my explanation. I shall reconsider the matter, and will write to him to confirm the outcome of those considerations.

Dominic Grieve: I fully understand the Minister's criticism of the word ''has''. I did not intend to cause the mischief that the Minister has identified—the provision seemed to read much better when that word was included. As the subsection stands, it still reads badly. Perhaps somebody could sort that out. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 87 - Notification requirements: travel outside the United Kingdom

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Annette Brooke: First, I apologise for the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley), who cannot be here today. I should like to comment on an issue relating to clause 87 with which she has been closely connected: the concern that convicted sex offenders have had to notify United Kingdom authorities of plans to travel abroad only if they are travelling overseas for eight days or more.
 The arguments have been much rehearsed and the Government have made a statement that the period of time will be reduced. That is welcome, because in relation to the sex tourism industry, the issue is one of trying to regulate demand and supply. It is horrifying to see research that suggests that British men are among the top five nationalities to sexually abuse children in Cambodia. I want the Minister's reassurance that the change in the foreign notification regulations from eight to three days will take place as soon as the Bill is passed. Perhaps he could give us an idea of the time horizon, as the longer we take to change the regulations, the longer that sad activity can go on.

Sally Keeble: I, too, would welcome clarification about whom this part of the Bill will affect.
 I spent time in Heathrow seeing what was happening there. Home Office staff had cleverly intercepted a man who had been convicted but not yet sentenced for a sexual offence and who was travelling abroad with his partner's 14-year-old daughter. The girl was travelling with the consent of her mother—it was a bizarre case. The staff asked whether conditions could be imposed that would prevent sex offenders using even a small gap like that to travel abroad with children.

Hilton Dawson: I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole and my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble). Although I congratulate the Government on the steps taken to reduce the number of days covered by the legislation, I ask whether there is a case for allowing any number of days for travel without an offender's notification. People can travel a great distance in a short time these days; why on earth can we not have a regulation setting out that any sex offender preparing to leave the country has to give notification, however long they are going away for?

Paul Goggins: I will get back to my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre on that question.
 In response to the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole, we will implement the part of the Bill mentioned from May next year; in other words, as soon as is practically possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North gives an example in which there is some practical difficulty. The interministerial group established by the Home Secretary will follow through the implementation of 
 the Bill and see how any difficulties or problems can be ironed out. I hope that hon. Members with experience of such problems will raise them so that we can consider them and ensure that the Bill is properly implemented.

Sally Keeble: Will the clause apply to people on remand, between conviction and sentence? That was the gap that the man used to take his partner's 14-year-old daughter abroad, at his partner's suggestion. Fortunately the Home Office staff were very skilful and picked up on the strange body language; they then started asking questions, discovered what was happening and stopped it. I would be happy to have my hon. Friend's response later in writing.

Paul Goggins: My hon. Friend is generous in giving me time to come back to her with a clear answer. My instinctive inclination is to say that we should close that loophole, but we need to be clear. I will confirm that to her.
 I understand the motive behind the remark made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre about whether such people should be allowed to travel anywhere. Most people's gut reaction would probably be to agree with him. However, it is important to have a degree of balance and judgment when framing legislation. We feel that we have struck a better balance; a balance has to be struck and we feel that we have got it right.

Hilton Dawson: I am not at all clear why we should be seeking to strike such a balance. If someone could travel abroad to abuse a child, why on earth should we allow three days leeway? People can travel a great distance in that time.

Paul Goggins: I agree. If it could be shown that the person intended to travel in order to abuse a child sexually, we would take action. The most serious offenders will be subject to arrangements that monitor their conduct and behaviour. However, let me give my hon. Friend a different scenario, which argues for proportionality. What if somebody who has committed an offence so horrendous that it has led to notification is beginning to rebuild their life in a sensible way and has to travel abroad on business as part of their effort to reconstruct their life and become a positive member of the community? If we allowed no travel at all, they would not be able to do that. There must be some balance and proportionality. It was wrong to have had the period of 14 days: we have reduced that to three days, which is a significant reduction, and we think that the balance is now about right.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. I was not aware that we were proposing to stop travel. I thought that this clause was about notification. In the example that he suggests, I do not see why somebody who is trying to rebuild their life should not be prepared to give information to the authorities about the perfectly legitimate purpose for which they want to travel abroad.
 I visited Romania with UNICEF several years ago, when the welfare and rights of children in that country were in a deplorable state. Bucharest is about three and a half hours away from Heathrow, and paedophiles from this country were travelling to abuse children in that city. Someone who is as determined to abuse children as we know paedophiles are could easily get around the regulations that we are setting out in the Bill. They could go to a country such as Romania, where thousands of children are vulnerable and wide open to abuse by determined people. With all the creditable efforts that are being made to prevent that, I do not see why there is a case for allowing any sort of loophole.

Paul Goggins: My hon. Friend might not have drawn the same conclusion as me, but it is important to bear in mind the level of compliance with regard to the notification requirements and the requirements for travelling abroad. In relation to notification and registration, we currently have 97 per cent. compliance. That is an encouraging level, but we need to improve on it. That is another reason for proportionality. If we do not have a sensible balance, people may seek to go abroad anyway, in which case we will not know that they have gone abroad and they may pose a risk that we do not even know about.
 I completely understand the picture that my hon. Friend paints of the situation in Romania: all Committee members are moved by the vulnerability of the children there. However, for reasons of proportionality and the need to ensure compliance, I ask him to reflect and perhaps to draw the same conclusion as I have.

Vera Baird: I cannot understand why someone who has turned over a new leaf and is going abroad for a legitimate purpose should have any reservations about telling the authorities what they are doing.

Paul Goggins: I agree, but my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre was beginning to hint that we should not allow such a person to travel abroad. That is what I understand his point to have been, but it is clear that he wishes to illuminate me further.

Hilton Dawson: I was speaking to clause 87 stand part. I am not proposing that people be prevented from travelling outside the United Kingdom. They should be required to notify the authorities that they propose to travel abroad if they come into the relevant category of convicted sex offenders, regardless of how long their trip might be for—not if they are just proposing to travel for more than 3 days.

Paul Goggins: I shall reflect on my hon. Friend's comments, and I ask him to reflect on mine.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88 - Method of notification and related matters

Paul Beresford: I beg to move amendment No. 108, in
clause 88, page 44, line 26, at end insert— 
 '( ) Where a person notifies an address in accordance with the provisions of this Act the police shall have the power to visit the offender to ascertain that the details are correct and to enable them to produce, or assist them in the production of, a risk assessment. 
 '( ) Where subsection (5) applies it shall be the duty of the person subject to the notification requirements to cooperate with the police attending those premises.'.
 The aim of the registration is to enable the police to protect us. They have a duty to visit sex offenders, to check that the details on the registration are correct, and to conduct a risk assessment—it is irrelevant whether they do that themselves or an agency does it, so long as it is done. 
 Paedophiles—and especially predatory paedophiles—are devious and persistent. In many cases, they believe that what they are doing is normal, and that what we, the rest of the population, are doing is wrong. Anyone who saw the first two programmes of the BBC 3 series that ran six months to a year ago would be aware that not only are they devious but they can be extremely aggressive. The Metropolitan police have assessed the success and fulfilment of their monitoring procedures, and they were rather relieved to find that they had about a 90 per cent. success rate. However, the remaining 10 per cent. appears to consist of aggressive people who are determined to buck the system. The police are concerned: they do not believe they have the power to visit sex offenders at home to ensure that the details are correct or conduct a risk assessment. The amendment would give them that power and would require those on the list to co-operate fully with the police.

Paul Goggins: Once again, I place on record my appreciation of the work that the hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) has done on the taskforce on child protection on the internet. I thank him for his rigorous work and general interest in the subject. I understand the spirit in which he tabled the amendment.
 The amendment would give the police the power to visit a relevant offender at his notified address to ascertain whether the details provided to them were correct, and to produce a risk assessment. We have given serious consideration to the subject, which was raised during the review of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the review concluded that such a power was not necessary, and I continue to agree with that conclusion. However, I hope that I can say one or two things that will offer him some reassurance. 
 First, in clause 86, we are introducing a new requirement for offenders to go to their local police station annually to confirm their notified details. Failure to make that annual notification is a criminal offence, in the investigation of which the police may, of course, under existing powers, visit the offender's home. If an offender does not make that annual visit to restate their details, that failure could become the subject of a criminal investigation, and the police would have the power to enter that offender's home. 
 Secondly, in new clauses 15 and 16, we are proposing to provide a new power that will enable the information notified by registered sex offenders to 
 be regularly checked against information held by other Government agencies. That will involve cross-referencing with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, for example. Any discrepancies noticed in that process will be passed to the local police for further investigation. 
 Thirdly, the police already have a general power to apply for a search warrant when investigating whether a crime has been committed. That would include a breach of the registration requirements. There are already a number of circumstances in which police may enter an offender's home. 
 The review of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 noted that nearly all registered offenders co-operate with the police when home visits are made. The review concluded that a specific power of entry was not justified and that there were other, less intrusive, means of confirming that an individual was living at a stated address. I hope that that helps to reassure the hon. Gentleman. 
 On the second issue of assisting the police with risk assessments, we have already put in place the arrangements that were referred to earlier—the multi-agency public protection arrangements, or MAPPA. All registered sex offenders are subject to these arrangements, and higher-risk offenders will be subject to consideration by a multi-agency panel that will look in detail at the risk they pose. Sex offenders leaving prison or beginning a community sentence are already required to attend appointments with a probation officer at which a wide-ranging risk assessment, covering all aspects of their offending behaviour and lifestyle, is carried out. 
 I understand the hon. Gentleman's point about the frustration that police officers may feel in carrying out their important duties in relation to the management of sex offenders if they feel that a particular sex offender is not co-operating. However, MAPPA and other arrangements are in place to help support them in the work that they do. The point has come up several times that we have to guard against providing powers that seem attractive on the surface, but would mean that the police could question any sex offender at any time. We must ensure that the public protection systems and processes are in place, but we must leave an opportunity for people to rebuild their lives in a way that is constructive and free from the kind of sexual harm that they have caused in the past. Once again, the question is one of balance. 
 I hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman that we are taking his concerns into account. We feel that the relevant powers and processes will give us the level of protection that he requires. I hope that in that spirit he will consider withdrawing his amendment.

Paul Beresford: I shall go away and look at the points that the Under-Secretary made. However, I should like to make an additional point. We are out of step with much of the rest of the western world, although it is fortunate that we are out of step with one part of it—I refer to the United States. Megan's
 law would cripple the efforts we are making to turn attention to sex offenders, especially paedophiles.
 From the information that I have picked up, particularly from the American forces dealing with paedophiles, I have found that there is often casual calling in just to check the computers and talk to them. Those forces are able to do that because they have the power to walk in. That is much cheaper and easier than setting up a huge committee to consider sex offenders and go through the bureaucratic rigmarole, and so on. That activity picks up some surprising cases and it is preventive. The police here cannot do that and, even in spite of what the Under-Secretary said, they will not be able to do it. I would like him to think carefully about that and test it with those who have to implement the legislation, and have the duty to produce the safety that we are requiring. 
 I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90 - Young offenders: parental directions.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 375, in
clause 90, page 45, line 37, leave out paragraph (b).

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 376, in 
clause 90, page 45, line 37, after 'must', insert 
 'take such steps as are reasonably practicable to'.

Dominic Grieve: The clause places burdens on parents, or those acting in a parental capacity—having parental responsibility—in relation to the notification process. I am aware that our law imposes many burdens on parents and some of those have criminal sanctions attached to them. I am, however, bound to say to the Under-Secretary that I am a little bit concerned about how the clause has been put together.
 Under 90(2)(b) a requirement is placed on the parent not only to carry out the notification procedure where there is a young offender—anybody under the age of 18—because they have a parental responsibility, but to ensure that 
''the young offender attends at the police station with him, when a notification is being given.''
 If there is a failure to do that, we go to clause 92, under which a failure ''without reasonable excuse'' could be met by summary conviction, or indeed conviction on indictment, for a term not exceeding five years. If somebody had the misfortune to have a young sex offender in the family, there may be many instances in which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to secure the attendance of that young offender at the police station at the parent's request. For that to result in potentially draconian criminal sanctions raises a question about whether we have got this section right. 
 Forgive my being pedantic, but I dislike clauses being written in the manner in which clause 90 is written. The words ''must ensure'' in clause 90 are 
 qualified in clause 92 with an exoneration of ''without reasonable excuse''. What does that mean in this context? 
 The first of my two probing amendments would delete 90(2)(b), thereby removing the burden on the parent to ensure that the young offender attends at the police station. It is all very well imposing duties on parents, and I accept that there is a duty on parents to tell the police if a young offender who is their child or a person for whom they have responsibility is moving to another address, but to compel them to bring that young offender to the police station is a step too far. 
 The second amendment, No. 376, would make it explicit that all that is required of the parent is to take all reasonably practical steps to ensure that the young offender personally attends the police station. It would spell out explicitly in the Bill the degree of parental responsibility. Many questions remain to be asked about such matters. It would help if the Minister would tell us who has parental responsibility and how far that extends. It would also help if he would explain the defence of ''without reasonable excuse'' and what facts would constitute an exoneration. For example, let us imagine that I told my 17-year-old to come with me to the police station to register and he told me to get lost or used stronger language than that. Is that a reasonable excuse for not producing him at the police station? 
 Moving on from there, is it right to impose a burden on a parent in such circumstances? Is it right that the parent should be included potentially in draconian sanctions amounting to up to five years imprisonment on a trial on an indictment? I have asked many questions, but it would be extremely useful if the Minister would explain the Government's approach.

Humfrey Malins: The clause deals with persons with parental responsibility. Will the Minister cover the position of certain people who might have parental responsibility? First, let us consider a young person who has come to this country from abroad. He has no parents here, but is looked after by a grandparent, an older cousin or a brother. What is the exact extent of parental responsibility in such close relationships?
 Secondly, what of those young people who do not have parents, but who are under the supervisory care of a local authority? What will be the exact position of a local authority officer who effectively has parental control? 
 Thirdly—I now come to a frequent occurrence—what is the position of a young man from Hong Kong or Korea who is a border at a school in this country? He or she sees his or her parents once or twice a year and, when in this country, is entirely under the supervision of the headmaster of the boarding school. Is there a requirement on that person? 
 Fourthly, can the Minister give me one example of an offence under the clause by a person with parental responsibility that could merit five years imprisonment on an indictment?

Paul Goggins: I am, as always, grateful to the hon. Member for Woking for asking such precise questions. As for what parental responsibility means and who will be caught by it, it has the same meaning as that under the Children Act 1989. For example, I could easily understand the role of the natural parent or a guardian, whether the person is a grandparent or other relative. The hon. Gentleman raised some important issues, such as the position of a foster-parent, a social worker or whoever is appointed to be responsible for the child. I want to satisfy myself on some of those questions. They are fair, and I shall write to the hon. Gentleman in response to them.
 We need to be clear that the practical implication, were the amendments accepted—although I acknowledge that they are probing—would be that the young offender in question would not be required to go to the police station with their parent when the notification was made on their behalf. There are very important reasons why the young offender should go to the police station with the parent, not least the need to take fingerprints.

Dominic Grieve: Let me make it clear to the Minister that I fully appreciate the desirability of the young person going to the police station with the parent. My concern is the draconian imposition on the parent of ensuring attendance in circumstances where, in practice, it might prove very difficult to exercise parental authority to bring that about.

Paul Goggins: I have some sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman says, and I shall come to that in a minute. Just to return to the practicalities, it is important to get on the record the point that I was making in terms of fingerprints and photographs. During the course of a year a young person's appearance may change as they mature. It is important to have as up to date a record as possible.
 I have sympathy with some of the arguments that the hon. Gentleman advanced, particularly on amendment No. 376, but that amendment is not necessary because, as he demonstrated in his argument, a parent who fails to comply with clause 90(2)(b) will commit an offence only if they do not have a reasonable excuse for doing so. Failure to ensure that a young offender attends a notification will not be pursued by the police where the parent has made all efforts to ensure that the offender attended. The key point there is to have made all efforts. Clearly, if an incident is a one-off where the child dismisses the parent and says that they are not prepared to co-operate on that one occasion, that will not be a sufficient excuse because there is clearly a relationship of control and discipline there that would ordinarily mean that the child would accompany their parent to the police station. If, however, there is a complete breakdown in the relationship, the parent has a fair defence. Where the parent has lost control of the young offender, or the offender ceases to be their responsibility, they can, as can the police, apply for the parental direction to be varied or discharged. 
 We take very seriously the burden, as the hon. Gentleman put it, that we are placing on parents here. It has a practical use. We do not want the message to go out that young people need not bother to turn up 
 with their parents. It is essential that they do. Where the situation has irretrievably broken down, there is a defence for the parents. I hope that in light of those reassurances the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances and I shall not press the amendments. Perhaps I have a rather old-fashioned view. I am mindful of the fact that parents have responsibilities towards their children, but those do not historically tend towards acting as the agent of the police in ensuring compliance with criminal court sanctions, and having potential criminal penalties visited on them for non-co-operation. That makes me slightly uneasy. I accept the Minister's point that there is a reasonable excuse provision in clause 92, but it still causes me some concern and I hope that the Minister can satisfy me on that.

Hilton Dawson: I am surprised at the hon. Gentleman's view of parental responsibility. I should have thought that it was the duty of a parent, as far as possible, to ensure that a young person complies with the requirements of the court. Would it not be an important indicator to the relevant authorities if a parent were not able to exercise sufficient control over a young person who had been convicted of serious offences? Could it not give rise to the thought that problems and further offending might arise in future with that young person?

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. He will see that I specifically targeted the issue of the parent ensuring attendance. If a parent has responsibility for a child under the age of 18, and the family moves house with that young person, I see no difficulty in having a requirement on that parent to ring up the police to say, ''I am informing you that my son who has a conviction for a sex offence and is on the register has moved from A to B. I have told him to go down to the police station—indeed, I will take him there—but he says he will not come.'' I have no difficulty with that burden.
 However, the wording of clause 90 puts a mandatory duty on a person to ensure their child's attendance at a particular place and at a particular time. That is a curious requirement in the context of the enforcement of the criminal law. I acknowledge, as I did when I moved these probing amendments, that there is the defence of reasonable excuse. I expressed some dislike of the drafting—the clause says one thing, but there is a caveat in another clause. I have raised that point in discussion of previous legislation, but I am told that this is the modern practice with which we must live. Notwithstanding that, clause 90 still makes me uneasy. I appreciate the desirability of young people attending at the police station, and of parents co-operating with the police, but it is the stark wording of clause 90(2)(b)—''the parent must ensure''—that I dislike. Words matter in the drafting of legislation. I have raised my concerns with the Minister, and as I do not disagree with the clause's intention, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91 - Parental directions: variations, renewals and discharges

Amendments made: No. 308, in 
clause 91, page 46, line 24, after 'Scotland' insert 
 ', where the appropriate court is a civil court'.
 No. 309, in 
clause 91, page 46, line 28, at end insert— 
 'and in any other case, the prosecutor;'.
 No. 310, in 
clause 91, page 46, line 34, after 'Court' insert 
 '(or in Scotland a criminal court)'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Clause 91, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92 - Offences relating to notification

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 250, in
clause 92, page 47, line 12, leave out paragraph (b).
 The amendment is a continuation of the discussion we were having on the previous group of amendments. It was separated from the other amendments when I thought that they might be grouped together. The amendment relates to whether the draconian nature of the sanction of up to five years imprisonment on conviction or indictment could have any relevance for clause 92(2)(b). I accept that it could have profound relevance for some of the other clauses and offences to which it relates, but this is over the top. As a matter of good practice, we should not have an offence that can have visited upon it a sanction that bears no relation to its gravity. If a parent fails to ensure that a young offender attends at a police station, even if that is done wilfully, I cannot think of grounds for that being triable on indictment or punishable by five years imprisonment. I am enforcing the point that I was making under the earlier group of amendments, but this amendment does have a separate existence.

Humfrey Malins: I asked the Minister under an earlier clause what possible situation he could envisage where a parent could or should go to prison for five years. I ask the Minister whether there is a parallel to be drawn with a parent who is brought before the magistrates court for failure to ensure school attendance. That is something that has been in the news rather a lot recently, and the Government propose to have on-the-spot fines of £25, doubling to £50 the next week and doubling thereafter. I do not think that the Government have yet announced that a parent will be liable to five years on indictment for failure to ensure school attendance, yet some would say that the degree of culpability of the parents in the two cases is no different. What possible situation could deserve a five-year sentence? Given that a continuing failure to send a child to school can result in more prosecutions and successive day prosecutions, why does that same principle not apply to a failure to ensure attendance at a police station? What are the main differences
 between the attendance at school compulsion and this compulsion?
 When the Minister writes to me in due course, will he deal fully with the issue of boy soldiers who are under the care of a commanding officer once they leave home?

Paul Goggins: I am rapidly learning that one must become an expert on a range of issues to participate in some Committees.
 On how the provision might relate to school attendance, I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are discussing the Sexual Offences Bill. However, consistency is important. I shall consider his question and get back to him. On boy soldiers, I suspect that the hon. Gentleman has been involved in a long-running campaign. He has had an opportunity to make his point. 
 The first point that I would like to make is that, while there is some continuity between our previous discussion and this one, we must remember that clause 92 covers all offences, not just parental directions.

Dominic Grieve: Of course, I appreciate that the effect of the amendment would be to remove the five-year term for all other offences. I hope that I made it clear in introducing the amendment that that was not what I intended, as I fully appreciate that that would be undesirable. However, I wanted to focus on the five-year sentence in clause 92(2)(b), which is totally disproportionate. What is probably needed is a minor amendment to clause 92 to ensure that the particular fault is summary only.

Paul Goggins: I will reflect on the hon. Gentleman's point. To answer the hon. Member for Woking, who asked whether I could give an example of circumstances in which a parent might be sent to prison for five years, frankly, as I stand here now, I cannot. The significance of a five-year sentence is that the offence becomes arrestable, which would be of some practical benefit to the police. I shall reflect further, but I ask him to accept that that is an important point.

Vera Baird: I think that the Opposition are being uncharacteristically soft. If there is absolutely no reasonable excuse for a parent not to bring their child to report, I do not see why there should not be a penalty that includes the availability of arrest as a step toward enforcement. Of course, if it is impossible for a parent to bring the child, there is the power in clause 91 for him to apply to be discharged from the responsibility to do so.
 May I raise a different issue? If the parent is arrested for failing to bring the young person, what happens to the young person? Is there a penalty against the young person, who does not bear responsibility for his own reporting because his parent does? What happens? How is the registration of a young person enforced once the parent has been arrested?

Paul Goggins: To respond directly to my hon. and learned Friend, there are no direct consequences in law for the young offender in that scenario. However,
 there would be huge implications and consequences for their welfare. Clearly, the young person would be placed in further difficulty if the parents were charged with the offence, and welfare and other organisations would become involved.
 We have had many discussions throughout our deliberations about whether particular offences should be summary only or triable either way. In the spirit that I promised prior to the conference recess, I looked very carefully at the issue. There is an argument for consistency, and I hope that at some point there may be some good news for members of the Committee who have been pressing for consistency in legislation. We must also have consistency in the Bill. 
 Hon. Members know the history: when the Sex Offenders Act 1997 came into force the offence was a summary-only offence; the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 made it an offence that could be tried either way. Amendment No. 250 would reduce the maximum penalty available for a breach to six months. One of the worst aspects, which touches on the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, is the sort of message that would be sent out if, having increased the seriousness of the offence, we then reduced its seriousness. That would send a regrettable message to the victims of such crimes and the wider community. We need consistency and I believe that we have got the balance right.

Dominic Grieve: I must apologise to the Committee for having raised a hare by giving the impression that in our probing amendment we were trying to get rid of the indictable offence for all the categories of breach of clauses 84(1), 85(1), 85(4)(b), 86(1) and 88(4). I absolutely agree that in relation to the person who must register and carry out the notification procedure, there are compelling arguments for the offence to be arrestable. Plainly, the first thing that the police will want to do if they fail to observe the terms is to arrest him for the reasons given by the Minister. Apart from anything else, he may pose a public threat.
 I have no problem with that, but the position of a parent, with respect to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, is different. The parent is not the sex offender or predatory paedophile. The parent is failing to carry out an obligation imposed by law to assist the working of the criminal justice system by bringing the child or young person to the police. I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which, first, arrest would be necessary, except as a form of harassment, because the police could proceed by summons; or, secondly, a sentence of more than six months' imprisonment would be necessary for what is effectively a failure to honour a commitment or requirement imposed by the state to help in the administration of justice. To impose a five-year sentence seems unnecessary and I can think of no circumstances, as, I believe, the Minister acknowledges, in which it would be needed; nor do I believe that a power of arrest would be particularly helpful. 
 I simply say to the Minister that as one of my jobs as Opposition spokesman is to scrutinise legislation to ensure that we put on the statute book legislation that is coherent and sensible, I hope that he will go away and revisit the issue of making breach of section 
 90(2)(b) an indictable offence because I do not believe that that is necessary and Parliament should not pass legislation that imposes substantial penalties unless that is necessary. 
 I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Vera Baird: May I press slightly further the point that I sought to make when discussing the previous amendment?

Roger Gale: Order. No. The amendment has been discussed. If the hon. and learned Lady wishes to raise a separate issue arising from the clause, she may do so, but she cannot reopen our previous debate.

Vera Baird: I used my words too loosely—of course I want to raise a separate issue.
 My concern is that clause 92 punishes—there is a debate about whether it does so too severely—a parent for not making a young person who needs to and should be registered do so. The penalty is against the parent. If the young person is not willing to register, the parent might get into the difficulty discussed under the previous amendment, with no penalty following and no apparent means of rectifying the position if a young person wilfully refuses to comply with the court's requirement to be registered. There seems to be no penalty, solution or means of enforcing the court's order, and that troubles me because it is an indication of a young person committing a sexual offence and not complying with what society deems are conditions that ought to be imposed on such a person. That is why it was appropriate to raise the matter as a separate issue from the question of the penalty on a parent and to wonder whether I am missing something in clause 92.

Roger Gale: It is unfortunate for the hon. and learned Lady that I listen to debates. She did, in fact, raise precisely that point. She may feel that the Minister did not answer it. Were I in any way partial, I might even agree with her, but the fact is that she raised the point before. However, if the Minister wishes to respond to the specific point, I am prepared to let him do so.

Paul Goggins: I will reflect on my hon. and learned Friend's comment. I reiterate the point that I made before: in such a case there would be consequences for the young person, although there might not be any consequences in law. For example, the young person might be taken into care as a result of the breakdown. There might be welfare consequences, although there would be no legal consequences.

Dominic Grieve: I have great sympathy with what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar said. It makes much more sense to impose a penalty on the young person for a failure to register, possibly in tandem with a penalty on the parent. However, simply to leave the young person with no penalty strikes me as surprising. After all, if a 15-year-old can commit serious offences, it seems odd that he cannot also have criminal sanctions brought against him for failure to register.

Paul Goggins: I am prepared to consider the matter further. Clearly, if the parents of a young person who has committed an offence so grave that he has to register cannot exercise sufficient discipline to get him to the police station, something even worse has happened.
 There would clearly be consequences for the welfare of the child and a need for supervision and support. Those would be issues taken up practically on the ground by the relevant agencies. Whether there should be consequences on the face of the Bill is a separate question, quite rightly raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar.

Vera Baird: I was envisaging a situation in which the parent was brought to court. They might put forward the reasonable excuse that they could not compel the child to come and register because of a breakdown in the relationship. That might mean that the parent was acquitted, so there would be no prison sentence and no need for welfare intervention to protect the young person. Yet the young person who refused to go and register would be left with the parent who could not compel them to do so. How does society protect itself against that young person's sexual tendencies thereafter?

Paul Goggins: In the situation in which the parent has lost control, they can apply for that order to be discharged. None the less, the question remains: what happens to that young person? My hon. and learned Friend asks a compelling question. I say again that in terms of welfare and other considerations, the local agencies will no doubt try to sort out the appropriate form of supervision and support. Whether there should be a consequence in law, in the Bill, is a separate question, which I will consider more deeply.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 92 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 93 - Certificates for purposes of Part 2

Harriet Harman: I beg to move amendment No. 311, in
clause 93, page 47, line 34, leave out 
 'to which this Part applies' 
 and insert 'listed in Schedule 3'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 312, 314, 322 to 326 and 372.

Harriet Harman: The amendments in this group are minor amendments designed to improve the clarity and accuracy of the wording of some of the clauses and to make a number of minor changes.
 Amendments Nos. 311 and 312 would replace, in relation to the offences for which a certificate may be issued under clause 93, the words: 
''to which this Part applies''
 with ''listed in Schedule 3''. That is needed to ensure that the offences in question are only those listed in schedule 3 and do not include those listed in schedule 4. 
 Amendment No. 314 adds, in respect of Northern Ireland, the offences of causing or inciting prostitution for gain and controlling prostitution for gain. These offences are introduced in part 1 of the Bill and already appear in the England and Wales list of offences in schedule 4. However, these offences also apply to Northern Ireland and they should also be listed in the Northern Ireland part of schedule 4. 
 Clause 130 provides that where an offence in schedule 3 has a sentence threshold, the offender is to be regarded as having a conviction for the offence only when the threshold is met. Amendments Nos. 322, 323, 324 and 325 clarify the ''condition'' must be a ''sentencing condition'' and not, for example, a condition relating to the age of the victim. 
 Amendment No. 326 removes from clause 131 reference to a ''conviction'' including a finding of guilt by a court martial as this is unnecessary—it is already included in the definition as the hon. Member for Woking will know—and amendment No. 372 removes reference to clause 57 from clause 139(2) as it does not apply to Northern Ireland. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 312, in 
clause 93, page 47, line 43, leave out 
 'to which this Part applies' 
 and insert 'listed in Schedule 3'.—[Paul Goggins.]
 Clause 93, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95 - Notification orders: applications and grounds

Annette Brooke: I beg to move amendment No. 253, in
clause 95, page 49, line 7, leave out 'must' and insert 'may'.
 This is a probing amendment, but it has a logical argument to it that relates to clauses 95 to 98. Taken together, those clauses contain an extension of the sex offenders obligation to those convicted of sex offences abroad. Under clause 95, a chief police officer may make an application to a magistrates court where it appears to him that a person was convicted abroad of an offence that would constitute a domestic sex offence as listed in schedule 3. A range of conditions are set out, and I understand those, but the concern is that while a complex judgment is being made on the nature of criminal law in another country—we are talking about a range of countries with very different criminal justice systems—clause 98 allows the individual concerned to be subject to an interim order.

Roger Gale: Order. The Solicitor-General cannot hold discussions with civil servants while a debate is taking place.

Annette Brooke: Thank you, Mr. Gale. While an investigation is going on, an interim order can be applied.
 I ought to make it clear that the amendment was proposed by Liberty. Where all the conditions are met, clause 95(5) provides that the court must make a 
 notification order. Therefore, there is police discretion at the beginning of the clause, but no judicial discretion at the end of the clause. Hence, we have tabled this—on the face of it—simple amendment that would remove ''must'' and replace it with ''may''. At no stage, during all the conditions and steps that must be gone through, are there any comments on the system of law in particular countries leading to tests before an order might be applied. I would like to hear the Minister's comments on the amendment.

Paul Goggins: I hope that my explanation in relation to the amendment will be as comprehensive as possible. The notification order is intended to be made against offenders who have been convicted overseas for a sex offence that, if committed in the UK, would have constituted an offence under schedule 3. It is important for public protection that all convicted sex offenders in the UK are subject to the notification requirements.
 The hon. Lady referred to the powers of the chief officer of police. A chief officer of police may apply to a court for a notification order against a person in a number of circumstances: where that person has been convicted or cautioned of an offence abroad; where the offence abroad would have constituted a schedule 3 offence had it been committed in any part of the United Kingdom; where the conviction, caution or relevant finding was made on or after 1 September 1997; where the conviction was before 1 September 1997 but on that date the offender was waiting to be sentenced or was serving his sentence; and, finally, where the conviction had been received in the United Kingdom, and the notification period for that offence and associated disposal would not have expired. Currently, where the court is satisfied that these conditions are met, it must grant a notification order. Under amendment No. 253, even where these conditions are met, the court would have discretion on whether an order should be made. I cannot support it. 
 We return to the familiar territory of earlier discussions about whether the notification requirements and registration are part of the penalty—the view the hon. Lady keeps pushing us towards—or whether that they are part of the administrative arrangements, which is actually the case. The notification requirements are, for offenders convicted in the United Kingdom, an automatic requirement arising from a conviction, caution and so forth for a sexual offence. The court has no discretion on whether an offender should be placed on the register. The Government have long argued that that is correct in order to ensure that the register remains a public protection procedure, and does not become confused with a penalty or a punishment for a sexual offence. 
 I fail to appreciate why, when a court is satisfied that an offender has received a conviction for a sexual offence abroad and that he meets the other conditions necessary for a notification order, the court should have the option of not granting an order. If the notification requirements are an automatic requirement following conviction for a relevant offence in the United Kingdom, why should it not be the case where the courts are satisfied that an offender 
 has been convicted for sexual offences abroad? We are also concerned that, if we allow courts to have discretion over which overseas offenders should be subject to the notification requirements, the position of the register as a public protection requirement and not a punishment or penalty handed down by the court will be undermined. 
 It may be that the amendments reflect concerns about convictions abroad being made under judicial systems that are less just or independent than our own: the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole alluded to that. Amendment No. 253 is intended to allow the court to refuse to make a notification order because it is concerned that a conviction or sentence received abroad was unjust. However, the offence committed abroad must equate to an offence in schedule 3. If that is disputed, the court may permit the defendant to require the police to prove that that is the case. That means that activity that may be a sexual offence abroad but which in the United Kingdom is not considered to be illegal—such as adult male homosexual activity, which remains an offence in some states—cannot lead to a notification order. 
 A notification order can only be made following an application from the police. Where the police do not believe that the conviction for an offence overseas would have constituted a schedule 3 offence if it had been committed in the United Kingdom, they would not proceed with an application for a notification order: the police must be convinced of the appropriateness of that.

Dominic Grieve: There is a point that I was going to make on clause stand part, but it can be more neatly addressed here. What is the position in relation to a foreign caution? Does the foreign caution have to comply with an English caution, in that it requires an admission by the person that he has committed the offence, or would it be possible for a person to be placed on the register after having received a foreign caution, which may be no more than a warning by the police in a foreign country against a particular type of alleged behaviour?

Paul Goggins: I am not an expert on the nature of cautions in the different judicial systems that operate throughout the world. Cautions may be different. I simply emphasise to the hon. Gentleman that it is not the caution but the offence that is of the greatest importance.

Dominic Grieve: That is not right. Clause 95(2) says:
''The first condition is that under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom . . . he has been cautioned in respect of a relevant offence.''
 I know how a caution works in England and Wales, but I have a concern, which I can develop during the clause stand part debate, that it is possible for someone to be cautioned abroad for an offence without admitting to committing it.

Paul Goggins: I will have to get back to the hon. Gentleman on the operation of cautions in other jurisdictions. They may operate differently, and if that is so, I will be happy to confirm that.
 I conclude my contribution and hope that the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole will withdraw her amendment.

Annette Brooke: I will withdraw my amendment, although some useful points have been raised. My concern was about the differences between different judicial systems, and I thank the Minister for his response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: At the risk of re-opening the issue, I believe that a few further points need to be made having heard the Minister's response.
 We may have anxieties about a system in which foreign convictions lead automatically to registration, as we may be concerned about the standard and burden of proof and the conduct of proceedings in those jurisdictions. On balance, I can see the force of having such registration, but I have serious reservations about the use of the word ''caution''. That word has a precise meaning in our legal and criminal terminology, but I believe that in many foreign countries, cautions or warnings are given by the police without requiring any admission of culpability by the recipient. 
 Clause 95 provides that cautions can immediately lead to notification and registration, which will lead to huge problems. Apart from anything else, a case would surely be brought immediately under the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, amplifying my remarks in my earlier intervention, I urge the Minister to give careful thought to the point. It must be made clear that the term ''caution'' in this context is defined as we would understand it in the United Kingdom, not as it might be understood in a foreign jurisdiction.

Roger Gale: Order. I gently rebuked the hon. and learned Member for Redcar for reopening a debate, and I am afraid that I will have to do the same again to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. Either we play by the rules or we do not. As a Chairman, I try to build flexibility into our discussions, but that must be on the understanding that we do not repeat debates. I will allow the Minister to reply, but I ask hon. Members not to reopen debates, as it merely prolongs proceedings and prevents us from debating other issues.

Paul Goggins: Your flexibility, Mr. Gale, not only this morning but throughout this Committee's deliberations, is greatly appreciated.
 I do not know whether the hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked his question out of knowledge or speculation. Given his background and usual approach, I suspect that it is out of some knowledge. As I have already promised, I will examine the matter and get back to him on it. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 95 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 96 to 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 - Other offences for purposes of Part 2

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 313, in
schedule 4, page 89, line 30, leave out lines 30 and 31 and insert— 
 '64 Murder. 
 64A Culpable homicide. 
 64B Assault. 
 64C Assault and robbery. 
 64D Abduction. 
 64E Plagium. 
 64F Wrongful imprisonment. 
 64G Threatening personal violence. 
 64H Breach of the peace inferring personal violence. 
 64I Wilful fireraising. 
 64J Culpable and reckless fireraising. 
 64K Mobbing and rioting. 
 64L An offence under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c.3) (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property). 
 64M An offence under section 3 of that Act (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosives with intent to endanger life or property). 
 64N An offence under section 12 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (c.37) (cruelty to persons under 16). 
 64O An offence under section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (c.27) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life). 
 64P An offence under section 16A of that Act (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence). 
 64Q An offence under section 17(1) of that Act (use of firearm to resist arrest). 
 64R An offence under section 17(2) of that Act (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for offence specified in Schedule 1 to that Act). 
 64S An offence under section 18 of that Act (carrying a firearm with criminal intent). 
 64T An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c.28) (hostage-taking). 
 64U An offence under section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (c.36) (hijacking). 
 64V An offence under section 2 of that Act (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft). 
 64W An offence under section 3 of that Act (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft). 
 64X An offence under section 4 of that Act (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles). 
 64Y An offence under section 105 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c.36) (ill-treatment of patients). 
 64Z An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (c.38) (prohibition of female circumcision). 
 64ZA An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c.33) (torture). 
 64ZB An offence under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52) (causing death by dangerous driving). 
 64ZC An offence under section 3A of that Act (causing death by careless driving when under influence of drink or drugs). 
 64ZD An offence under section 1 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c.31) (endangering safety at aerodromes). 
 64ZE An offence under section 9 of that Act (hijacking of ships). 
 64ZF An offence under section 10 of that Act (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms). 
 64ZG An offence under section 11 of that Act (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety). 
 64ZH An offence under section 12 of that Act (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation). 
 64ZI An offence under section 13 of that Act (offences involving threats). 
 64ZJ An offence under Part II of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system). 
 64ZK An offence under section 7 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (c.39) (procuring). 
 64ZL An offence under section 9 of that Act (permitting girl to use premises for intercourse). 
 64ZM An offence under section 11 of that Act (trading in prostitution and brothel-keeping). 
 64ZN An offence under section 12 of that Act (allowing child to be in brothel). 
 64ZO An offence under section 13(9) of that Act (living on earnings of male prostitution etc.). 
 64ZP An offence under section 50A of that Act (racially-aggravated harassment). 
 64ZQ An offence under section 51 or 52 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c.17) (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related offences), other than one involving murder. 
 64ZR An offence under section 1 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 (asp 13) (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related offences as specified in Schedule 1 to that Act). 
 64ZS An offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 7) (traffic in prostitution etc.). 
 64ZT An offence to which section 74 of that Act applies (offences aggravated by religious prejudice). 
 64ZU An offence under section 315 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 13) (ill-treatment and wilful neglect of mentally disordered person).'.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 217, in 
schedule 4, page 89, line 31, at end insert— 
 '64A Murder; 
 64B. Culpable homicide; 
 64C. Assault; 
 64D. Assault and robbery; 
 64E. Abduction; 
 64F. Plagium; 
 64G. Wrongful imprisonment; 
 64H. Threats of personal violence; 
 64I. Breach of the peace inferring personal violence; 
 64J. Wilful fireraising resulting in personal injury; 
 64K. Reckless fireraising resulting in personal injury; 
 64L. Mobbing and rioting; 
 64M. An offence under the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937; 
 64N. An offence under section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (c.27) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life). 
 64O. An offence under section 16A of that Act (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence). 
 64P. An offence under section 17(1) of that Act (use of firearm to resist arrest). 
 64Q. An offence under section 17(2) of that Act (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for offence specified in Schedule 1 to that Act). 
 64R. An offence under section 18 of that Act (carrying a firearm with criminal intent). 
 64S. An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c.28) (hostage-taking). 
 64T. An offence under section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (c.36) (hijacking). 
 64U. An offence under section 2 of that Act (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft). 
 64V. An offence under section 3 of that Act (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft). 
 64W. An offence under section 4 of that Act (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles). 
 64X. An offence under section 1 of the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 (c.38) (prohibition of female circumcision); 
 64Y. An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c.33) (torture); 
 64Z. An offence under section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52) (causing death by dangerous driving). 
 64ZA. An offence under section 3A of that Act (causing death by careless driving when under influence of drink or drugs). 
 64ZB. An offence under section 1 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c.31) (endangering safety at aerodromes). 
 64ZC. An offence under section 9 of that Act (hijacking of ships). 
 64ZD. An offence under section 10 of that Act (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms). 
 64ZE. An offence under section 11 of that Act (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety). 
 64ZF. An offence under section 12 of that Act (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation). 
 64ZG. An offence under section 13 of that Act (offences involving threats). 
 64ZH. An offence under section 51 or 52 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c.17) (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related offences), other than one involving murder. 
 64ZI. An offence under section 1 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 (ASP 13) (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related offences as specified in Schedule 1 to that Act.'.
 Government amendment No. 320.

Paul Goggins: Amendment No. 313 replaces the general reference to crimes inferring personal violence in paragraph 64 of schedule 4 with a long list of specific offences. The list does not include any of the sexual offences for Scotland, which are set out in paragraphs 33 to 57 of schedule 3. The list of offences is the Scottish equivalent of the offences for England, Wales and Northern Ireland already set out in schedule 4. The English, Welsh and Northern Irish counterparts are readily recognisable, and many of the statutory offences are common to all three jurisdictions.
 I do not propose to go through the Scottish list in great detail. For the most part, it is similar to the list of offences in amendment No. 217, which was tabled by the Opposition. It also includes the Scottish equivalent of the offences covered by paragraphs 62 and 63 of the England and Wales list that relate to prostitution and trafficking, and there are also several minor changes. 
 Amendment No. 320 is a consequential drafting amendment to clause 110— 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.